CANNON AIR FORCE BASE, N.M. -- Members of the 27th Special Operations Wing were introduced to Operation THURSDAY July 9 in an effort to promote overall quality of life for Air Commandos and families.

Operation THURSDAY gives Airmen the opportunity to take advantage of extended customer service hours for select agencies across the wing, and is designed for to those whose normal duty hours typically prevent them from utilizing standard hours of operation.

The 27th Special Operations Medical Group, 27th Special Operations Logistics Readiness Squadron, 27th Special Operations Security Forces Squadron, 27th Special Operations Comptroller Squadron and select wing staff agencies continue to provide customer service on a by-appointment basis every Thursday.

Members are expected to call the agencies listed HERE to make official appointments in order to utilize after-hours customer service; any cancelations must be made 24-hours prior to booked appointment times.

While Operation THURSDAY is a fairly new concept at the 27th SOW, historically it dates back to the World War II era and birth of the Air Commando.

According to a publication by the Air Force Historical Studies Office, the original “Operation THURSDAY” was a bold, unconventional use of American airpower to support British ground troops in Burma that marked a critical development in the history of modern warfare.

After the U.S. faced a devastating blow against its Hawaiian fleet in Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, Imperial Japanese forces quickly overtook much of the Far East region. Guam, Hong Kong, Thailand and the Philippines were a few among many to succumb to Japanese forces. American and British forces prepared for war on two fronts.

The Japanese invasion of Burma began on Dec. 23, 1941, with air raids on Rangoon. Allied forces planned to defend Burma with two British infantry battalions, two Indian infantry brigades, eight battalions of Burma Rifles, four mountain artillery batteries and the equivalent of six battalions of the Burma Frontier Force.

According to historians, these defenders lacked training and modern artillery, communications equipment and anti-aircraft weaponry. Unprepared for the swift Japanese advance, British Maj. Gen. William T. Slim retreated back to India with approximately 12,000 men.

After the fall of Burma in the spring of 1942, the Burma Road was cut and left China majorly isolated. Allied leaders feared this would lead to a shortage of materials and force Chinese leaders out of the war.

On March 19, 1942, British Brig. Gen. Orde C. Wingate, a specialist in irregular warfare, arrived in India. Wingate immediately began studying Japanese tactics and training. The general championed the use of long-range penetration columns, utilizing hit-and-run tactics behind enemy lines to strike railroads, river boats and brides to stop the flow of supplies from Rangoon and Mandalay to the enemy’s front lines.

Wingate put his forces through intense training, which prepared them to march great distances, engage the enemy in hit-and-run raids, locate and destroy transportation lines, and use the jungle as cover to evade Japanese attacks. His commandos became widely known as the “Chindits,” from the Burmese word Chinthe – mythological dragon-like statues that guarded beast-god temples and shrines in Burma.

Gen. Hap Arnold, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Forces, foresaw an opportunity to stage an invasion by air, the first ever attempted in military history. He sought uniquely qualified leaders to oversee this experimental operation. One of the officers he interviewed was Lt. Col. Philip G. Cochran, a seasoned fighter pilot with aerial victories in northern Africa. During his interview, Cochran told Arnold he was not interested in going to the Asian jungles in a resupply and evacuation role. However, he did recommend Lt. Col. John Alison, his roommate while he was stationed at Mitchell Field, Wisconsin, and Langley Field, Virginia.

Alison was a fighter pilot ace with seven aerial victories to his credit, and was well respected for his leadership and strong organizational skills. Alison echoed his friends’ response stating he preferred to return to combat as a fighter pilot.

Arnold issued a recall order for Cochran and Alison overruling their objections; deciding to make them co-commanders, he granted them wide-ranging authority to have this specialized mission accomplished. The two commanders were to report directly to Arnold on this top secret operation, dubbed “Project 9,” under the instruction: “To hell with paperwork, go out and fight.”

Cochran and Alison opted against co-command; Cochran being senior to Alison by several months became the Project 9 commander, and Alison his deputy. The two split responsibilities and formulated a plan to support Wingate’s long-range penetration concept. In the fall of 1943, the Project 9 commanders briefed their basic plan to Arnold, despite their concerns that their approach might be deemed too unconventional. After studying the plan, Arnold asked Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, an Air Staff officer, to review it. Vandenberg called the plan “ingenious” and Arnold quickly approved it.

Project 9 would be kept to a minimum size – less than 600 men. The objective was to build a lean, self-sufficient force capable of sustaining operations for up to 90-days.

The C-47 Skytrain was the obvious choice to transport Wingate’s forces across the rugged mountains into Burma. The aircraft could carry heavy loads over long distances and operate from relatively short, unimproved landing zones. It could also tow large CG-4A cargo gliders – instrumental in Cochran’s and Alison’s plan. The gliders would transport Chindits on the initial wave of the assault.

The original Project 9 date was set for Dec. 15, 1943, but was moved up to the first part of November. Operational training and theater indoctrination began at the end of December and continued through January. Glider pilots in particular had to complete training that had been delayed by the accelerated departure date.

Even before Cochran and Alison arrived in theater, the first phases of the allied invasion to retake Burma were over. In October 1943, as part of a coordinated effort to take back the Burma Road, a land route between India and China, two Chinese divisions began a march against Japanese forces in northern Burma. By February, forces were pushing deeper into Burma, with reinforcements from a specially trained infantry unit commanded by U.S. Army General Frank Merrill.

On Feb. 29, 1944, Wingate released the operational order for Operations THURSDAY to be carried out March 5. C-47s would tow 80 gliders to two distinct coordinates. Operation THURSDAY was scheduled to last one week, from March 5 to 12.

On March 5, 1944, Cochran dispatched a B-25 on a photo reconnaissance mission to check both field locations. Photos collected during that mission showed that one of the fields had been covered with large logs. Wingate worried the enemy had discovered both landing zones, obstructing one to force landing at the other where an ambush would be waiting.

After considering every possible explanation for the logs, leaders decided even if the Japanese had purposely logged one landing zone, they probably did not have an ambush waiting at the other. The invasion would go ahead as planned; except all 80 gliders would now go to one location.

After six days and nights, Operation THURSDAY officially ended as planned on March 11, 1944. In less than one week, two British units had been inserted well behind enemy lines without Japanese knowledge or interference. This marked the beginning of the Chindits’ campaign to disrupt Japanese lines of communication and supply. It also signaled the start of the support role to sustain Chindits against enemy forces.

On March 13, two days after the conclusion of Operation THURSDAY, Japanese fighters found the landing zone and tried to dislodge Air Commandos; while attacks were made daily, causalities were low. Keeping the Chindits resupplied with rations, ammunition and other necessities required substantial effort and Air Commandos found the best way to drop non-fragile cargo close to targets was to push goods out of aircraft while planes were close to the ground without actually landing. Aircrews were able to determine delivery location by coordinating with Chindits via common radio frequency. Ground officers communicated directly with air forces using simple terms to describe what pilots would encounter. Recognition signals were worked out to avoid over-complicated codes.

In late March, after suffering the loss of General Wingate, the 5318th Provisional Air Unit became the 1st Air Commando Group. From then until the start of monsoon season in May, Air Commandos continued to provide air support from air fields 150 miles behind enemy lines. For the first time in history, airpower had served as the backbone of an invasion, allowing Chindits to control points along Japanese supply and communication lines.

Air Commandos continuously demonstrated initiative, innovative spirit, and an emphasis on performance, rather than paperwork during these missions. As a result of their success, while the 1st Air Commando Group pulled out of Burma, Arnold called Alison back to the United Stated to help establish more Air Commando units.

Operation THURSDAY encouraged flexibility and promoted adaptability; these traits became trademarks of Air Commandos. America’s first Air Commandos demonstrated that air power could support unconventional warfare. American airpower proved it could be ready and willing to meet challenges – any time, any place.